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Roberts, Rules, and Rucho
CHAD M. OLDFATHER & SYDNEY STAR
This Article arises out of a symposium exploring the connection between
the political question doctrine and judicial legitimacy in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, and more specifically a panel devoted
to the implications of Rucho for theories of judgment and judging. Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion in Rucho emphasizes the need for judicial action to “be
governed by standard, by rule” and to be “principled, rational, and based on
reasoned distinctions.” Yet our analysis—which compares and contrasts the
arguments, reasoning, and rhetoric in Rucho with their counterparts in the Chief
Justice’s other opinions—suggests that Rucho ultimately fails its own test. Each
justification he offers in Rucho is one that Chief Justice Roberts has disclaimed or
acted contrary to in other cases, leading to the impression that his reasons were
cynically, rather than sincerely, deployed. In particular, the argumentative
structure in Rucho stands in deep tension with that in Shelby County v. Holder,
thereby giving rise to the very appearance of partisan motivation that Rucho
decries. The Chief Justice’s ostensible effort to avoid appearing to act out of
expediency in the short term thus threatens to undermine the Court’s perceived
legitimacy when viewed in the context of his larger body of work.
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Roberts, Rules, and Rucho
CHAD M. OLDFATHER & SYDNEY STAR*
INTRODUCTION
Toward the end of his opinion for a majority of the Supreme Court in
Rucho v. Common Cause,1 as Chief Justice John Roberts wrapped up the
Court’s analysis of the justiciability of challenges to partisan
gerrymandering, he offered a quote from the plurality opinion in Vieth v.
Jubelirer:2 “‘[J]udicial action must be governed by standard, by rule,’ and
must be ‘principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions’ found
in the Constitution or laws.”3
In doing so, he invoked a familiar conception of what lies at the heart of
adjudication. “Beyond doubt,” Henry Hart and Albert Sacks observe in their
classic materials on the legal process, “it is an integral part of the concept of
adjudication as exemplified in the conventional forms of the judicial process
that decision is to be arrived at by reference to impersonal criteria of decision
applicable in the same fashion in any similar case.”4 It is therefore a process
with “reasoned elaboration”5 at its core. A court must demonstrate that its
application of standards or rules in a given case is consistent with its
application in past cases. Whether such materials are available to guide
judicial consideration of claims relating to partisan gerrymandering is a
matter of longstanding debate, and, in a sense, Rucho’s conclusion that such
claims are nonjusticiable represents the seeming conclusion of that dialogue.
As is often true with respect to major Supreme Court decisions,6 the
dominant narrative surrounding Rucho is that it was a product of
partisanship—a case in which a conservative majority reached a result that
favored its interests because Republicans are simply better at
gerrymandering.7 Commentators have also addressed the question of
*
Professor, Marquette University Law School, and J.D. candidate, Marquette University Law
School. Many thanks to Ryan Scoville for providing extraordinarily helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
2
541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
3
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278).
4
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 643 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
5
Id. at 147 (emphasis omitted).
6
See generally Barry Sullivan & Cristina Carmody Tilley, Supreme Court Journalism: From Law
to Spectacle?, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (2020) (noting the tendency toward media depictions of the
Supreme Court’s decisions that characterize them in ideological terms).
7
See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, The Supreme Court Just Legitimized a Cornerstone Element of Voter
Suppression, NEW YORKER (July 3, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/thesupreme-court-just-legitimized-a-cornerstone-element-of-voter-suppression (“The precision of these

708

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:4

whether the Court in Rucho correctly reasoned its way to its conclusion. 8
The reception, generally speaking, has not been favorable.9
This Essay arises out of a presentation at a symposium dedicated to
exploring the connection between the political question doctrine and judicial
legitimacy, and, more specifically, it was delivered as part of a panel devoted
to re-examination of the theories of judgment and judging in light of
Rucho.10 We approach that task via an effort to engage with Rucho on its
own terms. A single case can, of course, shed only so much light on broad
questions of judicial behavior, and a single opinion can provide only so
much information about the true motivations that generated it. Yet a
qualitative analysis of a single opinion can yield clues as to whether it
appears to have been the product of reasoned elaboration. And so, we
examine Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Rucho against the backdrop of
his other opinions with an eye toward whether it meets the standard that it
sets. Are the reasons that he offers sufficiently consistent with his reasoning
in other cases to permit the conclusion that all are the product of the sort of
decision-making he extols? If not, are there nonetheless benign explanations
for any seeming inconsistencies? Or does the depiction of the Justices as
partisans provide the most parsimonious explanation?
Although we explore a range of possible explanations for the Chief
Justice’s behavior, our aim is not to settle on one as “correct.” We are
instead, like the Chief Justice, concerned with appearances. At the core of
Rucho’s articulated rationale is a concern with the judiciary’s need to act,
and appear to be acting, out of principle, and correspondingly to avoid the
appearance of partisanship. One might expect, then, to find consistency in
the analytical moves that Roberts makes, and in the conclusions that he
draws from them, across the opinions he has authored. An observer might
districts will generate Republican majorities that will then retain the power to draw even more favorable
districts, in a tribalistic feedback loop.”); Richard North Patterson, Why the Supreme Court Is Broken.
And How to Fix It., BULWARK (Aug. 15, 2019), https://thebulwark.com/why-the-supreme-court-isbroken-and-how-to-fix-it/ (characterizing Rucho along with Citizens United and Shelby County as
presenting “a classic illustration of using a fundamental organ of government—our Supreme Court—to
weaken democracy. It is no coincidence that these rulings favor one particular political party.”).
8
For examples of commentary that critique the substance of the Court’s reasoning, see G. Michael
Parsons, Gerrymandering & Justiciability: The Political Question Doctrine After Rucho v. Common
Cause, 95 IND. L.J. 1295, 1303 (2020); Edward L. Rubin, Gerrymandering and Judicial Incapacity, 2020
WIS. L. REV. 257, 272–73; Louis Michael Seidman, Rucho Is Right – But for the Wrong Reasons, U. PA.
J. CONST. L. (forthcoming); Girardeau A. Spann, Gerrymandering Justiciability, 108 GEO. L.J. 981, 983
(2020); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 128–29.
9
For examples of reactions of legal scholars in the popular press, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, SCOTUS’s Ruling on Gerrymandering Endangers U.S. Democracy, TIME (July 11,
2019, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/5623638/scotuss-ruling-on-gerrymandering-endangers-us-democracy/;
Charles Fried, A Day of Sorrow for American Democracy, ATLANTIC (July 3, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/rucho-v-common-cause-occasion-sorrow/593227/.
10
Chad M. Oldfather, Professor of L., Marquette Univ. L. Sch., Panelist at the Connecticut Law
Review Symposium: Empires or Umpires? Political Questions, Separation of Powers, and Judicial
Legitimacy (Oct. 9, 2020).
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disagree with the moves, conclusions, or both, but they would recognize,
and could respect, the consistency. Unfortunately, that is not what we find.
The Chief Justice’s opinions exhibit a glaring situationism when it comes to
his willingness to credit certain sorts of arguments.
We offer no confident verdict about the ultimate explanation for the
Chief Justice’s behavior. We do conclude that, especially when viewed
against the backdrop of other opinions he has written, Rucho failed to satisfy
its own standards for principled decision-making. We base that conclusion
on two sets of reasons. First, the articulated decisional process in Rucho.
Each justification the Chief Justice offered in support of the conclusion in
Rucho is one that he has disclaimed or acted contrary to in past cases. Indeed,
as we will show, the set of justifications offered in Rucho is, in all material
respects, the converse of those Roberts provided in support of the decision
to strike down a portion of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v.
Holder.11 In addition, the Rucho Court’s sub silentio overruling of Davis v.
Bandemer12 runs counter to his protestations in other cases about the “special
justification”13 necessary to depart from the doctrine of stare decisis. Second,
application of the political question doctrine itself and, in particular, the
strand relating to the need for “judicially manageable and discoverable
standards,” involves the very sort of ad hoc decision-making that the Chief
Justice decries. That is not necessarily problematic, or unprincipled, or even
avoidable,14 but it is, at a minimum, ironic.
I. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR AND JUDICIAL MANAGEABILITY
This Part sets up the analysis that follows. Subpart A situates our inquiry
and approach within the context of more general efforts to understand the
Justices’ behavior. Those approaches tend either to take “the Court,” rather
than individual Justices, to be the appropriate unit of analysis or to assess
individual Justices’ behavior by way of large-scale empirical study. Subpart
B then turns to the political question doctrine and, more specifically, to the
“judicially manageable and discoverable standards” prong that the Court
relied on in Rucho.
A. Assessing the Justices’ Behavior
Analyses of Supreme Court decisions typically involve an effort to
assess the degree to which a present opinion fits within the larger body of
11

570 U.S. 529 (2013).
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
13
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2101 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
14
Richard Fallon contends that any attempt to impose something like a “judicially manageable
standards” requirement on the process of identifying judicially manageable standards “could at most only
postpone an ultimate, open-ended, value-based choice about how best to implement constitutional norms
that are not themselves judicially manageable standards in the input sense.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1296 (2006).
12
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case law to which it belongs. “The Court,” in this conception, operates as a
constant and coherent entity, ideally both spinning and traversing a seamless
web of law. A given decision may fit within the pattern or it may be a
mistake. Either way, it is a product of “the Court,” and thus the appropriate
way to assess it is by reference to the remainder of the Court’s decisions.
As an ideal, that vision has considerable appeal. But as a description of
reality it misses something. For a point that is as often overlooked as it is
obvious: the Supreme Court is a “they” rather than an “it.” 15 The Court’s
output is best regarded not as the product of a consistent corporate unit, but
rather as the aggregation of nine individuals’ behavior. Those individuals
have different preferences and perceptions and will be motivated by
different things. To take just a single, stark example, what drove Justice
David Souter differed in a multitude of respects from what drove Justice
William O. Douglas.16 The Court thus speaks with nine voices rather than
one, and it will function differently—and reach different results, justified in
different ways—as its membership changes over time. As tempting as it is
to articulate a narrative in which the relevant actor is “the Court”—and in
which decisions from one era, or one decade, or one Justice can simply be
compared and contrasted on their own terms with those from another—to do
so is to overlook important determinants of the institution’s behavior.
There is, of course, a large body of empirical research that approaches
the Court’s work in a manner consistent with this insight. That work tends
to view the Justices’ behavior as the product of ideology. Its roots are in
studies that rely on reductionist proxies for the ideological valence of both
judges and their decisions.17 Its starkest embodiment is the attitudinal model,
which “holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of
the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply
put, Rehnquist vote[d] the way he [did] because he [was] extremely
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely
liberal.”18 Later iterations have refined this point, and the strategic, rather

15

Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 550 (2005) (identifying “the fundamental mistake of
overlooking the collective character of judicial institutions—of overlooking that the judiciary, like
Congress, is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’”).
16
Compare generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, DAVID HACKETT SOUTER: TRADITIONAL
REPUBLICAN ON THE REHNQUIST COURT (2005) (depicting a Justice who epitomized integrity and
avoided the spotlight), with BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS (2003) (depicting a Justice who was at best casual with the truth and craved the spotlight).
17
For powerful critiques of the approach, see generally Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology:
Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79 (2010); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding
Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 H ASTINGS L.J. 477 (2009).
18
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED 86 (2002).
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than attitudinal, model now holds sway among political scientists. On a
strategic account, judges and Justices do not simply vote their preferences
in every case; they may take a longer view, sometimes sacrificing immediate
results in service of larger goals, mindful all the while of the need to secure
their colleagues’ agreement and of the broader legal and political contexts
in which they operate. But the core idea remains: The Justices comprise a
“they” that is a group of political actors fundamentally indistinguishable
from their counterparts across First Street in Congress.
On this view, the story of Chief Justice Roberts and gerrymandering is
a simple one. Gerrymandering is a technique that primarily benefits
Republicans. Roberts, as an appointee of a Republican President, is thus
inclined, as an ideological actor, to favor gerrymandering and thus to favor
a legal regime in which the judiciary has no role to play in policing the
boundaries of gerrymandering. As we will see, much of the reaction to
Rucho reflects a similar interpretation of Roberts’s behavior.20
But not all observers of the Court or of judicial behavior more generally
accept the view that the Justices are simply “politicians in robes.” To
acknowledge that legal rules often allow space for the operation of value
judgments21 or to acknowledge more generally that judicial behavior will be
influenced by aspects of judges’ psychology or acculturation,22 is not to
concede that judging is entirely or fundamentally an ideological enterprise.
The ideological correlations apparent across a range of cases may be products
of factors that correlate with ideology, but that are not themselves ideology.
An alternative mode of studying judicial behavior is to approach it by
engaging in a particularized qualitative analysis of judges’ deployment of
reasoning—not quite in the fashion of traditional doctrinal scholarship, but
with an emphasis on process over substance. Doing so will often reveal more
than the study of results alone can uncover. Most of the cases that make it to
the Court are difficult cases, the sort that pit an array of competing
considerations against one another. It often will be the case that any given
Justice will have an ideologically driven preference for a particular outcome
that will feature among the considerations driving her approach to the case.
But there are values that a Justice might hold that can conflict with first-order
ideological concerns. A Justice might embrace a “passive virtues”-driven
19

LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 7
(2006) (noting that “a strategic conception of judicial behavior is now the closest thing to a conventional
wisdom about judicial behavior”).
20
See infra notes 200–04 and accompanying text. See also Spann, supra note 8, at 1024 (contending
that “one of the consequences of the Rucho decision is that it now leaves the white Republicans who
control most statehouses and governorships in the United States free to engage in unbridled partisan
gerrymandering that seems certain to help whites and harm racial minorities”).
21
Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1946 (2009) (arguing
that “some play for inherently contestable political judgments is simply built into law”).
22
See Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 981, 1009–16 (2018).
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desire to avoid conflict with other branches. Other generally accepted
jurisprudential considerations can clash with one another in the context of a
specific case or issue. A Justice’s general preference for federalism might
clash with a broad understanding of an individual right. A taste for rules over
standards could run counter to a substantive principle that counsels in favor
of a more contextualized inquiry. A Justice who values stare decisis could
feel compelled to adhere to a result that she regards as wrong. 23 As Justice
David Souter once put the point, even “[t]he explicit terms of the
Constitution . . . can create a conflict of approved values, and the explicit
terms of the Constitution do not resolve that conflict when it arises.”24 To
focus simply on results or to remain in a doctrinal silo is to overlook the
multidimensional nature of the enterprise.
Perhaps many of these conflicts play out at once or in different ways in
different cases. For a somewhat pedestrian yet often overlooked point,
observers of the Court tend to imagine the Justices as having more cognitive
bandwidth than they probably do. It’s incredibly difficult to remain
principled and consistent across a range of cases pitting conflicting and
incommensurable values against one another. One can easily imagine the
Justices having the subjective sense that they are engaged in the application
of neutral principles even as the precise mix of principles they draw upon
and apply shifts from one case to the next for reasons that might be heavily
influenced by political or other non-legal considerations. In Judge Henry
Friendly’s phrasing, “each judge judges differently from every other judge
and . . . any one judge judges differently in each case.”25
This Essay focuses on Chief Justice Roberts and, more specifically,
undertakes to analyze his opinion for the Court in Rucho in light of his
jurisprudence more generally. Given the relationships among the
justifications he offers across his opinions, what appears to be taking place?
Does ideology seem to be the only, or at least the best, explanation for
Rucho’s reasoning and result? Was Roberts being political in a nonpartisan
sense—acting in a way that he perceived as necessary to protect the Court’s
institutional image? Was he simply following the law as he understands it to
the best of his ability? Was he less concerned with the result in this case and
as to this issue and more concerned about advancing some doctrine or
principle that cuts across a range of cases? In short, how and where does this
opinion satisfy its own criteria for principled decision-making in light of
what we might call The Collected Works of John G. Roberts, Jr.?

23
This is likely true of the three justices who wrote the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
24
David H. Souter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., Keynote Address at the 359th Harvard University
Commencement Ceremony (May 27, 2010), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-ofjustice-david-souters-speech/.
25
Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 229 (1961).
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B. “Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards”
The political question doctrine, as characterized by Chief Justice
Roberts in his opinion for the Court in Zivotofsky v. Clinton,26 is a “narrow
exception” to the judiciary’s general “responsibility to decide cases properly
before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid.’”27 Fundamentally, as Martin
Redish puts it, the doctrine is a manifestation of the Court’s recognition of
“the possibility that it should avoid involvement in certain so-called
‘political’ disputes, largely because of an unstated fear that resolution is for
some reason beyond its province.”28 Redish continues by offering the
following list of possible reasons the Court might reach that conclusion:
“because the dispute does not lend itself to the development of judicial
standards, or because the Court deems itself incapable of assessing the
potentially momentous impact of its decision, or because the Court is
concerned about the adherence to its decisions by the political branches.”29
Whatever the precise logic, the result of the doctrine’s application is to
entirely insulate a category of claims from judicial review, as opposed to
allowing the claims to be reviewed but under a highly deferential standard.
Notably, this can lead to situations—and both Rucho and the earlier
gerrymandering case Vieth v. Jubelirer seem to be examples30—where a
majority of the Justices acknowledges the existence of a constitutional
violation while simultaneously disclaiming the power to address it.31
The canonical statement of the doctrine came in Baker v. Carr:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already

26

566 U.S. 189 (2012).
Id. at 194–95 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
28
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1037
(1985).
29
Id.
30
See infra note 59 and accompanying text .
31
Fallon, supra note 14, at 1276 (noting that application of the judicially manageable standards can
result in a situation in which “a gap can exist between the meaning of constitutional guarantees, on the
one hand, and judicially enforceable rights, on the other”).
27
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made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.32
As the Baker Court noted, “The nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers.”33
Most of the criteria do indeed relate to situations in which the Court
could justifiably be wary of intruding on the operations of the other branches
of the federal government. But the lack of “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” prong, which the Court primarily relied on in Rucho,
is different. When those components of the doctrine are in play, the
underlying judgment is not that the constitutional text requires that the
decision rest with another branch or that prudential considerations lead the
Court to conclude that the question is best addressed by a coordinate branch.
It is instead that there is no law based on which a court can make, or reason
its way to, a decision. As with the political question more generally, the idea
is at least hinted at in Marbury v. Madison.34
Crucially, the Court has provided no definitive framework for
determining when judicially manageable standards exist. Stated differently,
there is no developed body of law by which to determine whether a specific
type of dispute can be resolved by reference to law.35 Richard Fallon has
undertaken the most comprehensive effort to extract principles from the
Court’s cases.36 He identified three types of criteria the Court uses in
identifying judicially manageable standards. The first is intelligibility—
whether a proposed standard is something that can be understood.37
Although this seems self-evident, Fallon notes the existence of disagreement
over, for example, whether tests involving an inquiry into legislative intent
are coherent.38 The second is a collection of “practical desiderata” that can
32
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). For a comprehensive history of the doctrine, see generally Tara Leigh
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908 (2015).
33
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
34
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide
the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In some instances there may be difficulty in applying the rule to particular cases;
but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty in laying down the rule.
Id. at 165. These sentences, which appear in the Court’s discussion of whether Marbury has a
remedy if he has a right, can be interpreted in two ways. One reading is that it’s a reference to a distinction
between “law” and “not law,” and an assertion that courts can properly rule on a dispute only if they are
able to do so by resort to law. Under that reading, Marbury clearly presages the “judicially discoverable
and manageable standards” prong of the doctrine. The second, perhaps less natural, reading emphasizes
the reference to guidance to the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. On that view, the reference would
not be to the standard governing the specific dispute but rather to a jurisdictional rule along the lines of
the political question doctrine.
35
Fallon, supra note 14, at 1281.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 1285–86.
38
Id.
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be emphasized to a greater or lesser degree in a given context, including
“analytical bite,”39 “formal realizability,”40 the “ability to generate
predictable and consistent results,”41 “administrability without overreaching
the courts’ empirical capacities,”42 and “capacity to structure awards of
remedies.”43 These factors, Fallon hypothesizes, carry no clear
determinative weight across categories: “there is no single quantum that
would be both necessary and sufficient in every case, regardless of the nature
and importance of the constitutional provision at issue.”44 The third type of
criterion accordingly involves an all-in consideration of whether all that has
come before yields the conclusion that a claim is appropriate for the courts.
“The inquiry at this stage seems perhaps no better defined than the question
whether, all things considered, the costs of permitting adjudication under a
particular proposed standard outweigh the benefits.”45 Fallon’s conclusion
is striking: The question of whether disputes can be resolved by resort to
judicially manageable standards ultimately reduces to “substantially
open-ended judgments about whether it would be better, all things
considered, to allow litigation to proceed or instead to decree a category of
disputes nonjusticiable.”46 The standards for determining whether
something is a political question might fail themselves. Put differently, there
is no law governing the question of when there is no law.
As explicated by Fallon, the concept of judicial manageability recalls
Lon Fuller’s articulation of the limits of adjudication.47 Fuller’s goal was to
identify the features separating the types of disputes that can appropriately
be resolved through an adjudicative process from those that cannot, and he
links the inquiry directly to the political question doctrine,48 which “could
hardly be said to rest on any principle made explicit in the Constitution; it
was grounded rather in a conviction that certain problems by their intrinsic
39
“Even if a test or standard is rationally comprehensible as applied to clear or paradigmatic cases,
it may still be judicially unmanageable if it requires distinctions for which conceptual resources are
lacking in too many instances.” Id. at 1287.
40
“If formal realizability were a requirement of judicial manageability, a test would need to
mandate clear results in all or nearly all cases, with little need for further contestable judgments, in order
to count as judicially manageable.” Id. at 1288.
41
“If we ask why some indeterminate standards are judicially manageable whereas others are not,
the answer seems to lie largely in predictive judgments about the pattern of results that decisionmaking
pursuant to any particular standard would likely produce.” Id. at 1289. This, in turn, seems to be a product
of a “relative consensus or lack of consensus about the meaning of underlying norms.” Id. at 1290.
42
“A test may be deemed judicially unmanageable if it would require courts to make empirical
findings or predictive judgments for which they lack competence.” Id. at 1291. Often this is a comparative
assessment, in which courts’ abilities are contrasted with those of other institutions. Id.
43
“Concerns about standards to guide the award of remedies occasionally influence judicial
decisions to dismiss disputes on political question grounds.” Id. at 1292.
44
Id. at 1293.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1296.
47
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 393–409 (1978).
48
Id. at 355.
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nature fall beyond the proper limits of adjudication.” At the core of his
analysis is “one simple proposition, namely, that the distinguishing
characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected
party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting
proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.”50 From that, it
becomes possible to identify the limits of adjudication. Stated generally,
“[w]herever successful human association depends upon spontaneous and
informal collaboration, shifting its forms with the task at hand, there
adjudication is out of place except as it may declare certain ground rules
applicable to a wide variety of activities.”51
Under Fuller’s conception of the judicial role, disputes may be unfit for
adjudication because they are “polycentric,” involving many variables
interacting in such a way that adjustments to one will invariably have effects
on the others.52 Fuller suggests the analogy of a spider web, where “[a] pull
on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout
the web as a whole.”53 Difficulties may likewise stem from a lack of
preexisting rules from which reasoned arguments may be made.54 Fuller
concedes, though, that reasons need not always preexist, but can in some
instances be developed on a case-by-case basis through the mechanism of
adjudication. He cites federalism as an example of a concept that, in its
general form, is too amorphous to provide the basis for reasoned analysis,
but allows its contours to be worked out over time, and “this kind of
development—this gradual tracing out of the full implications of a system
already established—can take place only in an atmosphere dominated by the
shared desire to make federalism work.”55 Incremental development of
principles by courts over a run of cases is sometimes permissible, but only
where it can be based on a sufficiently broad consensus regarding the
governing norms.
It bears noting again that a determination that a matter presents a
political question precludes judicial review of such matters at all. This is
striking because constitutional law is rife with doctrines the contours of
which are informed by the very sorts of considerations underlying the
“judicially manageable standards” prong.56 Constitutional claims receive
more or less deferential review based on a set of inferences that parallels
49
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Id. at 364.
51
Id. at 371.
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Id. at 394–95.
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Id. at 395.
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Id. at 377.
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Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Political Questions and the Ultra Vires Conundrum, 87 U. CHI. L. REV.
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50

2022]

ROBERTS, RULES, AND RUCHO

717

those involved in the political question determination. A large part of the
rationale for the deferential nature of review under the Commerce Clause or
of Equal Protection claims that do not involve suspect classifications is that
the laws under review are typically rooted in underlying judgments of degree
and policy that are better left to the political branches.57 Courts will nearly
always defer in such situations, but, because they retain jurisdiction to hear
the claims, they remain able to intervene in circumstances where the political
branches have acted irrationally or otherwise abused their discretion. As
Fallon points out, there are many doctrinal areas in which such an approach
results in the underenforcement of constitutional norms.58 But a
determination that an issue presents a political question is another matter
entirely. It removes courts’ ability to police even the boundaries of a
constitutional provision and thereby creates the prospect of a situation in
which an agreed upon violation of the Constitution goes unremedied. Again,
one interpretation of Vieth v. Jubelirer is that all nine Justices agreed that
extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the Constitution, even as a
majority concluded that the specific claims presented were nonjusticiable.59
The Rucho Court can arguably be characterized in the same way. Extreme
partisan gerrymandering may thus be both unconstitutional and nonjusticiable.
II. ANALYZING RUCHO
A. An Overview
In Rucho, the Court considered challenges to the gerrymandering of two
congressional districting maps. A map from North Carolina favored
Republicans, and one from Maryland favored Democrats.60 In both cases a
federal district court had found in favor of the challengers.61 The claims were
that the gerrymandering ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, the First
Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, Section 2, which provides

57

See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 308–11 (2002) (considering the analogous
ways in which the Court has treated the political question doctrine and its review of Congress’s exercise
of the commerce power). The key point here is that the underlying legislative determinations are not
clearly of a different sort than what is involved in redistricting. Both involve the balancing of complex
factors and the assessment of causal relationships that are not susceptible to easy resolution. And yet the
Court has not hesitated to impose outer bounds on the exercise of the commerce power. Indeed, in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995), it did so against a longstanding backdrop in which the
imposition of such bounds had been abandoned as unworkable.
58
Fallon, supra note 14, at 1299–1303.
59
See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 809–10 (2005) (“For
the first time, all the Justices agreed that the pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is sometimes
unconstitutional.”).
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Rucho v. Common Cause,139 S. Ct. 2848, 2491 (2019).
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that members of the House of Representatives be selected “by the People of
the several States.”62
The effectiveness of the gerrymandering was not in question. Both the
majority and dissenting opinions acknowledged its extent. Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion noted that “[t]he districting plans at issue here are
highly partisan, by any measure”63 and that they “involve blatant examples of
partisanship driving districting decisions.”64 The majority conceded that
“[e]xcessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem
unjust”65 and emphasized that the majority “does not condone excessive
partisan gerrymandering.”66 Justice Kagan’s dissent used more pointed
phrasing. A small sample, from the opinion’s second paragraph: “These
gerrymanders enabled politicians to entrench themselves in office as against
voters’ preferences. They promoted partisanship above respect for the
popular will. They encouraged a politics of polarization and dysfunction.”67
From there, the opinion proceeded to walk through the evidence that the
district courts had taken into account in concluding that these gerrymanders
were constitutionally problematic.68 Invoking a core piece of evidence
concerning the extremism of the North Carolina map, the dissent offered that
“[b]y any measure, a map that produces a greater partisan skew than any of
3,000 randomly generated maps (all with the State’s political geography and
districting criteria built in) reflects ‘too much’ partisanship.” 69
The issue the Court faced, then, was not whether the gerrymandering
under review was excessive. One can at least infer a general agreement that,
no matter how one defines excessive partisanship in gerrymandering, these
cases met the standard. The issue instead was whether partisan
gerrymandering, no matter how excessive, presents the sort of question that
is within the competence of the federal courts to decide or whether it is instead
a nonjusticiable political question outside the scope of the judicial power.70
For the first time in its history, the Court drew on a perceived lack of judicially
manageable standards to answer the latter question in the affirmative.71
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Rucho draws on the second and third
strands of the doctrine as laid out in Baker v. Carr, both of which concern
what might be characterized as the boundary between legal and non-legal
determinations. If there are not rules of the sort that courts are accustomed
to working with, the reasoning goes, then resolution of a dispute would be
62
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according to factors that are not law and which are accordingly beyond the
proper scope of the judicial function. Consistent with Fuller’s characterization
of the nature of the judicially manageable standards framework, the opinion
takes a somewhat protean approach to characterizing the nature of the
political question inquiry presented. As in Vieth, even the majority appears
to acknowledge that the gerrymandering in question is constitutionally
problematic, noting that it “does not condone excessive partisan
gerrymandering,”72 which is “incompatible with democratic principles,”73
while acknowledging that the problem it confronts involves “separating
constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.”74
For the most part, the opinion deems the key question to be whether
there are “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” available to
provide rules of decision in partisan gerrymandering cases.75 But two
additional supporting considerations appear at various points along the way.
One—a concern about judicial interventions that would directly affect the
allocation of power between the political parties—seems to be an invocation
of Baker’s third prong, relating to policy determinations.76 The other, which
we explore in greater depth below, is that there is no clause in the
Constitution that gives the courts the authority to entertain such claims.77
The Court’s reasoning proceeds as follows. First, that partisan
gerrymandering has been with us since the beginning: “The practice was
known in the Colonies prior to Independence, and the Framers were familiar
with it at the time of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.” 78 The
key implication is that some partisan gerrymandering must therefore be
acceptable, such that the question that would confront a court is not simply
whether it exists, but whether too much of it exists.79 It briefly traced the
history of its past efforts to address the question, then turned to the matter of
justiciability. The Court made no real effort to articulate the standards by
which it would approach that inquiry, noting at the outset simply that “we
are mindful of Justice Kennedy’s counsel in Vieth: Any standard for
resolving such claims must be grounded in a ‘limited and precise rationale’
72

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id. at 2506 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787,
791 (2015)).
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Id. at 2504.
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See id. at 2491 (“This Court . . . has struggled without success over the past several decades to
discern judicially manageable standards for deciding such claims.”); id. at 2494 (characterizing the
difficulty presented by partisan gerrymandering cases in terms of judicially manageable standards); id.
at 2500 (“There are no legal standards discernable in the Constitution for making such judgments, let
alone limited and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and politically neutral.”); id. at 2502
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and be ‘clear, manageable, and politically neutral,’” so as to avoid
entanglement with the political process.81 Because the decisions under
review would be inherently partisan, it is important to have a clear standard
lest the courts end up appearing to be political actors themselves.
The opinion next turns to exploration of how an assessment of excessive
partisanship might work, beginning with an effort to identify the baseline
from which such an assessment would proceed. “Partisan gerrymandering
claims,” it asserts, “invariably sound in a desire for proportional
representation.”82 But, because proportionality has never been required, the
Court continues, “plaintiffs inevitably ask the courts to make their own
political judgment about how much representation particular political parties
deserve—based on the votes of their supporters—and to rearrange the
challenged districts to achieve that end.”83 Note the Court’s characterization
of a political judgment, which it then discusses in terms of versions of how
the concept of “fairness” might be defined and applied to partisan
gerrymandering claims. Such judgments, it concludes, are beyond its capacity:
80

Deciding among just these different visions of fairness (you
can imagine many others) poses basic questions that are
political, not legal. There are no legal standards discernable in
the Constitution for making such judgments, let alone limited
and precise standards that are clear, manageable, and
politically neutral. Any judicial decision on what is “fair” in
this context would be an “unmoored determination” of the sort
characteristic of a political question beyond the competence of
the federal courts.84
Even were it possible to establish a baseline, there would remain the problem
of determining when a departure from that baseline becomes too great. Here,
the Court proceeds primarily by providing a list of questions that would have
to be answered and, in doing so, points out the various difficulties that courts
would face in prioritizing the factors they would be required to consider.85
Justice Kagan in dissent concedes that the majority identifies legitimate
concerns. “Judges should not be apportioning political power based on their
own vision of electoral fairness, whether proportional representation or any
other. And judges should not be striking down maps left, right, and center,
on the view that every smidgen of politics is a smidgen too much.”86 They
should intervene only in “egregious cases,”87 with the baseline being not
80
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some abstract concept of fairness but rather a given state’s own stated
districting criteria.88 In answer to the majority’s concerns about the
difficulties involved in assessing how much partisanship is too much, Justice
Kagan offers a simple rebuttal: “How about the following for a first-cut
answer: This much is too much.”89 It is not necessary to decide every case
in the first case, and the dissent contemplates the development of standards
over a series of cases if necessary to address future extreme cases.90
The majority rejects both the use of states’ own criteria as a baseline and
the dissent’s “this much is too much” approach to assessing degree.91 It
acknowledges that courts often must grapple with matters of degrees, but it
contends that “those instances typically involve constitutional or statutory
provisions or common law confining and guiding the exercise of judicial
discretion.”92 Here, it continues, neither the Constitution nor common
experience provide enough raw material for judicial analysis.93
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court echoes the factors
that Fallon and Fuller identify, even as it does not engage in a deep or
systematic way with the concept of judicial manageability. The opinion’s
framing of partisan gerrymandering places it squarely within Fuller’s
category of polycentric disputes.94 Viewed in isolation, the analysis seems
entirely consistent with the rationale underlying the judicially manageable
standards prong of the political question doctrine. If the Chief Justice
sincerely believes the concerns he identifies to be legitimate, then it follows
that he could legitimately and sincerely conclude that questions relating to
partisan gerrymandering are beyond the judiciary’s capacity to resolve. As
we will see, however, there are reasons to question Roberts’s sincerity.
B. Breaking Down Rucho’s Rationale
We turn now to assessing Rucho’s analysis in light of Chief Justice
Roberts’s jurisprudence more generally. Has he made the same arguments
and raised the same concerns consistently? Does the best reading suggest
that he indeed believes the concerns set forth in Rucho’s analysis to be
legitimate? Or does his deployment of arguments appear to be cynical and
thus inconsistent with principled decision-making? We have not analyzed
all of his opinions. But even our limited review supports the conclusion that,
at the very least, he has not found the arguments he offered in Rucho to carry
the same weight in other contexts. To the contrary, he has frequently offered
arguments and made rhetorical moves that are the converse of those in
88
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Rucho. His opinion for the Court in Shelby County v. Holder alone
provides considerable support for this conclusion. It offers reasoning that is,
at best, in deep tension with and, at worst, directly contrary to that in Rucho
on each important component of their respective analyses.
1. There Is No Clause in the Constitution
As noted above, the Court acknowledged in Rucho that the
gerrymandering in question was, at best, problematic, though it stopped
short of characterizing it as a constitutional violation, concluding instead that
“we have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the
absence of a constitutional directive or legal standards to guide us . . . .”96
“There are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such
judgments,”97 the Court noted in concluding its discussion concerning what
it regarded as the need for it to settle on a meaning of “fairness” in order to
adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims. It responded to the dissent’s
plainly correct assertion that courts routinely assess matters of degree by
suggesting that partisan gerrymandering claims are different: “[T]hose
instances typically involve constitutional or statutory provisions or common
law confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion. . . . Here, on
the other hand, the Constitution provides no basis whatever to guide the
exercise of judicial discretion.”98 The Guarantee Clause having already been
deemed an insufficient peg on which to hang justiciable claims,99 there is
“no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution.”100 The fact that state
courts have formulated and adopted approaches to partisan gerrymandering
is inapposite; those courts have done so on the basis of text that “can provide
standards and guidance for state courts to apply.”101 But “there is no ‘Fair
Districts Amendment’ to the Federal Constitution.”102
This is curious logic on its own terms. Florida’s Fair Districts
Amendment provides simply that “[n]o apportionment plan or individual
district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or
an incumbent.”103 That text no doubt limits to some extent the universe of
possible judicial approaches to gerrymandering, but it’s difficult to conclude
that it is materially more concrete than the Equal Protection, Due Process,
or, for that matter, Guarantee clauses. And, as Justice Kagan pointed out, the
95
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guidance. Id. at 2524 n.6 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 2507. The Chief Justice has employed similar rhetoric before. See Obergefell v. Hodges,
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court grounded its approach to gerrymandering in
clauses providing that “elections shall be free and equal” and that no one
may “interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”104
Because something as indefinite as a Fair Districts Amendment would
apparently make a difference in Roberts’s estimation, the suggestion here
seems to be that even an indeterminate constitutional provision—though not
the Equal Protection Clause105—could somehow work to save a claim from
the argument that it cannot be resolved by resort to judicially discoverable
and manageable standards. One might, if one were unaware of the fate of the
Guarantee Clause, imagine that this is a nod in the direction of an exception
to the judicial manageability requirement for situations where claims are tied
to a specific textual provision. The logic, as noted, is opaque at best.
What is more, the Chief Justice does not consistently weigh the absence
of a provision in the Constitution as grounds for declining to exercise the
Court’s authority or for concluding that deferential review is appropriate.
Consider his opinion for the Court in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau,106 in which the Court struck down restrictions that
Congress had placed on the President’s power to remove the CFPB’s
director. “It is true,” the Court explained, “that ‘there is no “removal clause”
in the Constitution,’ but neither is there a ‘separation of powers clause’ or a
‘federalism clause.’ These foundational doctrines are instead evident from
the Constitution’s vesting of certain powers in certain bodies.”107
Consider, as well, Shelby County,108 in which the Court struck down §
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which was originally passed in 1965 pursuant
to Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. As originally
enacted, it had a built-in limited term, and it had been periodically
reauthorized since. The reauthorization before the Court in Shelby County,
which was backed by extensive factfinding, took place in 2006,109 and, while
it did not change § 4(b)’s formula for determining which jurisdictions were
covered by the Act, it did expand the scope of prohibited conduct under §
5.110 In striking the Section down, the Court relied on three concepts—
federalism; “the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty;” and the
proposition that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by

104
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current needs”—that have no textual home. The Court nonetheless found
itself compelled to conclude that Congress had overstepped its bounds.
111

2. The Lack of a Developed Body of Law
In addition to the lack of directly applicable text in the Constitution,
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Rucho leans on the lack of
any other developed set of legal standards—by implication, a body of case
law—on which courts could draw in assessing the appropriateness of
partisan gerrymandering. This features most prominently in the opinion’s
response to Justice Kagan’s dissent, pointing out that courts commonly
adjudicate questions of degree. “True enough,” the Court replies, “[b]ut
those instances typically involve constitutional or statutory provisions or
common law confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion.”112 It
characterizes the dissent’s analogy to the need to deal with anticompetitive
effects under the Sherman Act as inapposite based on the common law roots
of antitrust law.113 This is, at best, a clumsy sleight of hand. Much of the
Court’s work involves making judgments of degree under the banner of
vague provisions that may serve as a hook for the Court’s analyses, but often
provide no guidance apart from the body of law that the Court has developed
around them.114
Such concerns have not troubled Roberts in other cases. Indeed, they do
not otherwise trouble him in Rucho itself, in which he fails to acknowledge
that the judicially manageable standards prong of the political question
doctrine fails this very test because, while there are past cases discussing the
concept, they do not converge on a clear test and certainly not one invoked
in Rucho.115 Moreover, the Chief Justice’s opinion never pauses to consider
that even the common law had to start somewhere. Every line of cases and
every body of precedent began with a first case, and that first case did not
answer all the questions raised in subsequent cases. The Court does not say
why Rucho could not be that case.116
It is with respect to this aspect of Rucho that Shelby County provides the
starkest contrast. The “equal sovereignty” principle on which the Court
relied to invalidate § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act was, in one
characterization, “surprisingly unsupported.”117 Judge Richard Posner called
111
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it “a principle of constitutional law of which I had never heard—for the
excellent reason that . . . there is no such principle.”118 But there is more.
Roberts in Shelby County provides little authority for the proposition that the
Voting Rights Act “imposes current burdens and must be justified by current
needs”119 beyond the Court’s assertion of that proposition in its opinion—
also authored by the Chief Justice—in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District,120 where it appears unaccompanied by anything other than a general
cite to a law review article.121 And while the idea that courts should have
some authority to consider whether changed facts bear on the continued
constitutionality of a law is not a new one,122 it is underdeveloped both in
Shelby County and in general.123 Yet, in neither case—and in contrast to
what we will encounter in the next subpart—did the Chief Justice seem
troubled by or even raise the multitude of questions left unanswered.124 What
are the standards by which current burdens and current needs are to be
assessed? How much change is necessary to invalidate a previously valid
statute? Does recent legislative engagement with a statute undercut claims that
changed facts have undermined the statute’s rationale? Are these questions
that can be answered by resort to judicially discoverable and manageable
standards? Do they involve policy determinations of a kind clearly unfit for
judicial discretion? Shelby County engages in a great deal of performative
handwringing about the need to not act lightly in striking down an act of
Congress,125 coupled with concern about an approach to doing so that would
leave the Act “effectively immune from scrutiny.”126 But, in doing so, it
exhibited little concern about the fact that there is no clear constitutional
provision or developed body of law on which to ground its analysis.
3. An Unwillingness to Determine Matters of Degree
Rucho places a great deal of reliance on the fact that courts considering
claims relating to partisan gerrymandering would have to determine when it
becomes excessive. The “central problem,” the Chief Justice notes by way
of quoting the Vieth plurality, is “determining when political
118
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gerrymandering has gone too far.” Its resolution would require “a limited
and precise standard that is judicially discernable and manageable,”128 and
the Court can identify no such standard.129 On the way to reaching this
conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts poses a host of what he calls
“unanswerable” questions, identifying hypothetical features of potential
cases for which neither the majority nor the dissent have a clear answer.130
Where would the line be? What should we count? How will we know when
we have enough?
Roberts has used this rhetorical move before, making the perfect the
enemy of the good as a way of resisting recognition of a constitutional claim.
His most ostentatious use of the technique came in Caperton v. Massey,131
in which he dissented from the Court’s holding that due process required a
state supreme court justice to recuse himself from a case in which a corporate
officer of one of the parties had made massive donations to his campaign.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did not articulate a precise test for
determining when a campaign contribution triggers a recusal obligation, 132
emphasizing instead the “extraordinary” and “extreme” nature of the
situation before the Court.133 The Chief Justice critiqued the majority’s
failure “to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases[,]” 134 then
proceeded to emphasize the point by providing a list of forty questions
(“only a few uncertainties that quickly come to mind”) left unresolved by
the majority.135
Yet, for all this, it is not difficult to find instances in which Roberts has
been content to draw upon indistinct lines without answering questions akin
to those he raises in Rucho and Caperton. For example, in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,136 in considering the claim
that the Medicaid expansion included in the Affordable Care Act involved
an unconstitutional coercive exercise of the spending power, Chief Justice
Roberts was willing to conclude that Congress had crossed a conditional
spending line that was very difficult to discern and never before crossed.137
Just as in Rucho, Sebelius involved a situation in which the Court in
preceding cases had regarded the claim as justiciable, but had never struck
127
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down an instance of conditional spending. Just as in Rucho, Sebelius
involved what the Court characterized as an extreme case—not simply an
inducement for states to act, but rather “a gun to the head.” 138 Past cases had
“not attempt[ed] to ‘fix the outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to
coercion.”139 This time that was sufficient for the Chief Justice: “We have
no need to fix a line either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may
be, this statute is surely beyond it.”140 How much is too much? This much.
Gundy v. United States141 provides another example. Chief Justice
Roberts did not write for himself, but he joined Justice Gorsuch in advocating
for a rejuvenation of the nondelegation doctrine, which has gone effectively
unenforced due largely to the difficulties involved in formulating a test for
determining when a delegation has gone too far.142 As we demonstrated in
the preceding subpart, Shelby County provides a final point of contrast.
There are undoubtedly questions of degree involved in determining whether
there is an adequate fit between the current burdens imposed by legislation
and the current needs that justify it, and there must be some point at which
that fit is insufficient to sustain congressional action. The same holds for
intrusions on the issues of equal sovereignty and federalism, but Shelby
County provides no definitive clues as to the location of the applicable
thresholds and it shows little concern about the resulting uncertainty.
The more general point is this: There undoubtedly are legitimate reasons
for the Justices to worry about the effects of extensive judicial involvement
in the drawing of district lines. But it does not follow from that concern alone
that partisan gerrymandering ought to be shielded entirely from judicial
review. The questions of degree presented by the prospect of intervention in
gerrymandering exist in nearly every corner of constitutional law. The
political branches routinely draw upon decidedly non-legal factors in exercising
their powers, yet the Court reacts not by categorically insulating those decisions
from review but rather by reviewing them under deferential standards.
4. The Problem Is Too Difficult/Multi-Faceted
A related, but distinct, concern involves the nature of the judgment calls
that a court must make in adjudicating a claim. A simple, one-dimensional
question of degree presents one sort of problem; a polycentric issue with
multiple interacting parts presents another. Assessing a partisan
gerrymander entails making not just a binary judgment regarding the
appropriateness of an entire map, but perhaps also subsequent
138
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determinations regarding how the lines on the map must be adjusted in light
of that overall assessment. The multidimensional nature of the problem
presented by partisan gerrymandering appears primarily in the Court’s
discussion of the difficulties of assessing fairness. In the Court’s estimation,
any claim of partisan gerrymandering “inevitably ask[s] the courts to make
their own political judgment about how much representation particular
political parties deserve—based on the votes of their supporters—and to
rearrange the challenged districts to achieve that end.”143 “Fairness,” the
Court observes, could be measured by reference to the number of
competitive districts, to the number of safe seats, to traditional districting
criteria such as geography and existing political lines, or something else.144
The resulting determination would be “unmoored” and beyond judicial
competence.145 The Court also briefly discusses the remedial problems
presented, noting, by way of example, that a court analyzing a claim by
resort to traditional districting criteria would be required “to rank the relative
importance of those traditional criteria and weigh how much deviation from
each to allow.”146
Framed in that way, the conclusion that districting is beyond judicial
competence has intuitive appeal. Mapmaking is no part of the law school
curriculum, and a court confronted with the task of determining what the
“correct” districting map looks like would rightly be concerned about its
competence to do so.147 So viewed, partisan gerrymandering presents a
classic polycentric problem. Adjusting one district within a state has
immediate implications for at least one other district, and compensating
adjustments to that second district could easily radiate outward until the
entire map is in question. Each adjustment has, to use Fuller’s phrasing,
“complex repercussions.”148
Such concerns animated Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green,149
which concerned a challenge to congressional districts in Illinois.
Frankfurter’s concern was that “no court can affirmatively re-map the
Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards
of fairness for a representative system. At best we could only declare the
existing electoral system invalid.”150 Otherwise the Court would find itself
pulling at strands of a web, attempting to find some new equilibrium within
a complex, interacting pattern. Likewise, Roberts’s rationale implicitly
143
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Id. at 2499–2500.
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Id. at 2503–04 (“[A]sking judges to predict how a particular districting map will perform in
future elections risks basing constitutional holdings on unstable ground outside judicial expertise.”).
148
Fuller, supra note 47, at 394.
149
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
150
Id. at 553.
144

2022]

ROBERTS, RULES, AND RUCHO

729

touches on all of the practical desiderata that Fallon identifies. The Rucho
opinion characterizes the judgments involved as political, which can be
viewed as a claim that they require reliance on “distinctions for which
conceptual resources are lacking” and thus lack analytical bite.151 The list of
questions left unresolved by the Rucho dissent152 forms the centerpiece of its
claim that no test could generate clear results across the likely range of
cases.153 Additionally, as noted above, a concern about remedies underlies
the analysis generally.154
But that is not the only way to approach the problem. Because “[t]here
are polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to
adjudication,”155 a specific dispute’s perceived amenability to being
resolved by a court will often be a matter of framing. Rather than viewing
the problem of partisan gerrymandering as one requiring courts to draw lines
on maps, one could instead conceive of it as requiring courts to mark the
boundaries of mapmakers’ discretion.156 “Discretion” is, of course, a
slippery concept,157 but it is one brought to bear in situations where an initial
decision maker must make highly contextual decisions, often involving the
weighing of factors according to a situational logic that cannot be spelled
out in advance or articulated with much specificity. The parameters of that
discretion can often be discerned only in retrospect via the examination of
cases where it was deemed to be abused or properly exercised.
The point, as Fuller noted, is that a problem’s polycentric dimensions
can be worked out over time, especially given sufficient underlying
consensus on the norms that should govern resolution. As Fuller observed,
courts often deal with such polycentric problems when faced with questions
concerning federalism.158 The same is true for the separation of powers. Both
types of cases require courts to make judgments about, and potentially to
intervene in, a complex web of arrangements. An adjustment to the balance
of power between the federal government and the states can have
implications for the balance of power among the branches of the federal
government and vice-versa. As noted above, there is no text in the
Constitution speaking directly to either doctrine, and, to the extent that there
are limited, precise, and manageable standards of the sort contemplated by
the Rucho majority, they have been developed by the Court through a
151

See supra note 39.
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common-law process. In the situation presented in Seila Law, for example,
Congress’s decision to restrict the President’s ability to remove the director
of the CFPB was likely the product of a calculus in which it set other features
of the Bureau’s operating structure in ways that it would have adjusted had
it known it was unable to insulate the director. Given the seeming agreement
among the Justices in both Vieth and Rucho that the gerrymandering in
question was unconstitutionally excessive, it seems reasonable to imagine
that discernable constraints on mapmakers’ discretion could emerge over
time even with “this much is too much” as a starting point.
Shelby County likewise provides a window into the relationship between
framing and perceived polycentrism. Congress, in first passing and then
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act, undoubtedly made and then updated
evaluations of both the burdens imposed by the Act and the needs addressed.
On that conception of the case, Congress engaged in a periodic nationwide
assessment of voting rights, which presumably encompassed consideration
of the Act’s framework as it then existed, including the degree to which it
burdened federalism and the equal sovereignty of states. When Congress’s
relation to the Voting Rights Act is viewed in this way, it was the framing
of the question before the Court, rather than the underlying dynamic, that
brought the case outside the realm of polycentrism. In other words, the Court
regarded the issue in binary terms—Congress either exceeded or did not
exceed its power—and it felt no obligation to make the Act constitutional;
to provide Congress with any precise guidance concerning where the line of
constitutionality is;160 or to encourage Congress to prioritize and strike a
balance among federalism, equal sovereignty, and voting rights. Congress,
if so inclined, will simply have to take another run at the VRA and later find
out whether the Court regards the effort as constitutional.
5. The Need to Make Political Calculations
A persistent theme in the Rucho opinion is that adjudication of partisan
gerrymandering would necessarily entangle the judiciary in what are
inherently partisan disputes. It would require “courts to make their own
political judgment about how much representation particular political parties
deserve,”161 and to “reallocate political power between the two major

159

140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
One component of the Shelby County rationale came in response to the government’s argument
that Congress identified the jurisdictions to be covered by the Act and only then reverse-engineered the
formula that would lead to such coverage. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 551 (2013). Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion rejects this approach because it “does not even attempt to demonstrate the
continued relevance of the formula to the problem it targets.” Id. at 552. In outline form, of course, that
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political parties.” While not fully set out, one imagines the concern to have
two facets. First, that any ability to consider such disputes would present too
great a temptation for judges to engage in improperly motivated decisionmaking, in the sense that it would be too easy for judges to allow their
personal political preferences to affect their application of the law. Second,
that the public would perceive that improperly motivated decision-making
to be taking place, regardless of whether it actually was.
The goals of avoiding that temptation and that perception are laudable.
One imagines the Court’s strategy in Rucho of entertaining claims relating
to gerrymandering in two states—one in which the districts were drawn by
Republicans, and the other by Democrats—as an effort to further the
perception, and perhaps foster the reality, of unbiased decision-making.163
Whether that gambit was successful is another matter. Many observers
regarded it as a partisan win for Republicans.164
A point commonly made in discussions of the political question doctrine
is that courts decide questions with obvious political ramifications all the
time. Here, too, Shelby County stands in contrast to Rucho. The Shelby
County Court intervened in the political balance of power in a situation
presenting the temptation of and creating the perception of partiality. That
dynamic is unavoidable, as is the widespread perception, whether entirely
accurate or not, that the Justices are either conservatives or liberals and that
they cast their votes accordingly. As a result, it may be that, as Martin Redish
has suggested, the political question doctrine is concerned too much with the
image of the judiciary and too little with ensuring that the constitutional
system more broadly functions as it should.165
162

III. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
Our goal in this Essay is to assess whether Chief Justice Roberts’s
behavior in Rucho appears to exhibit the same constraint by rules, standards,
and principles that he extols in his opinion for the Court.166 The best
evidence that it does would be his consistent reliance on the same rules,
standards, and principles across a range of cases and contexts. As we have
demonstrated above, however, the reasons that Roberts offers in Rucho are
not reasons that he consistently offers as compelling whether taken
162

Id. at 2507.
“It may be that increasing evidence that the Court is being viewed as political has made the Chief
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38 CARDOZO L. REV. 551, 554 (2016).
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28, at 1049.
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individually or, as the contrast with Shelby County suggests, as a package.
He instead appears willing to overlook them, and even act contrary to them,
in addressing different constitutional questions. But does that necessarily
mean that he is acting improperly? This Part explores potential explanations
for his behavior, some of which are benign and some of which are not. We
do not claim to present a complete taxonomy of possible explanations for
the apparently contradictory nature of his justifications and his behavior, nor
do we purport to have located its true wellsprings, but we seek instead simply
to explore the most likely alternatives.
A. Inarticulable Standards
One of us has elsewhere endorsed the proposition that judges often—
and legitimately—draw upon reasons and intuitions that can properly be
regarded as legal even though they are not things that can be fully captured
in words.167 Stated somewhat differently, professional acculturation
produces shared understandings, including understandings about the proper
nature and scope of the judicial role. Richard Fallon has likewise
characterized constitutional law as such an endeavor, “constituted by the
shared understandings, expectations, and intentions of those who accept the
constitutional order and participate in constitutional argument and
adjudicative practices.”168 Fallon’s study of the manageable standards prong
of the political question doctrine revealed that it resolves to what are
ultimately contextual judgments about the costs and benefits of adjudication
in specific contexts.169 Taken together, these insights suggest an explanation
for the apparent inconsistencies in Chief Justice Roberts’s behavior. On that
view, he reached in good faith the conclusion that somehow—whether as a
matter of the costs and benefits, of the degree, of their unique combination,
or otherwise—the factors present in political gerrymandering cases hold no
prospect of being amenable to principled adjudication in any form and that
this unarticulated set of reasons therefore differentiates those cases from
most other constitutional disputes.
That is certainly a possibility. It’s not difficult to imagine that one could
instinctually regard the assessment of the constitutionality of lines on a map
as different from the process of reviewing whether Congress had the power
to pass a specific piece of legislation. Nor is it difficult to conclude that one
could hold that view without being quite sure what the nature of the
distinction is and therefore being unwilling to commit to a specific test for
identifying similar distinctions. Such beliefs—as an exercise of “situation

167
Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging and the Constitution (Or, Why Supreme Court Justices
Are Less like Umpires and More like Figure-Skating Judges), 72 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401–02 (2020).
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sense” or “I know it when I see it,” depending on whether one means
the characterization to be pejorative—can, in many observers’ eyes,
constitute appropriate justifications for the exercise of judicial power. Belief
in the legitimacy of inarticulable justifications does not, however, solve the
problem of Rucho, in part because Rucho flamboyantly advances a vision of
the judicial role inconsistent with such justifications. Recall its sneering
dismissal of Justice Kagan’s suggestion that “[t]his much [gerrymandering]
is too much,” arguing that she was “not even trying to articulate a standard
or rule.”172 And consider it further in light of the opinion’s apparently
opportunistic deployment of the components of its rationale. Placed against
the backdrop of Roberts’s opinions in other cases, Rucho appears not to be
an example of principled resort to situation sense or the type of judicial
behavior it extols, but rather decision by fiat.
170

171

B. Bounded Rationality
The Justices, like anyone else, are subject to cognitive limitations; they
are, in Herbert Simon’s classic phrasing, boundedly rational,173and, as a
result fall short of perfect rationality in their behavior. One might
accordingly construct a story about the Chief Justice’s approach as one in
which he simply takes cases as he finds them, that he is more of a technician
than someone drawn to overarching theory and as such is disinclined to think
beyond the doctrinal categories presented in a given case. On that view,
neither the contrast between Rucho and Shelby County nor the larger
disconnect between Rucho and a vision of the Court’s role grounded in
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products174 ought to be regarded
as surprising. Rucho emerged out of a line of cases in which the Court openly
struggled with the question of how (and whether) to approach claims relating
to partisan gerrymandering.175 The analytical path had been marked; the
alternative routes from the fork at which the Court found itself explored; and
the Chief Justice saw no need for further investigation.176 The cases
presented a choice between going with a large body of opinions questioning
justiciability or with the counterpart body supporting justiciability, the latter
of which would have required crafting a justiciable standard. Given that
170
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 214 (1960)
(describing the concept as an amalgam of “ways and attitudes which are much more and better felt and
done than they are said”).
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Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 8 (characterizing Rucho as squarely contrary to
Footnote Four’s vision of the Court’s role in facilitating democratic processes).
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See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (overturning Bandemer and declining to
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For an exploration of path dependency in constitutional law, see generally Michael J. Gerhardt,
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none of the principal briefs in Rucho even cited Shelby County and that the
few cites to it in amicus briefs were incidental,177 it should come as no
surprise that neither Chief Justice Roberts nor his law clerks would think to
contrast the reasoning in the two cases. After all, the idea apparently did not
occur to Justice Kagan or her law clerks either.
The process of offering conflicting rationales can snowball from there.
Once one has reached a decision, it is natural to emphasize reasons that
support that decision and to minimize those that do not.178 Dan Simon has
drawn on this insight to explore the phenomenon he calls “judicial
overstating:” “Judges . . . convey remarkably high levels of certainty in their
decisions. Opinions persistently portray the chosen decision as singularly
correct and as determined inevitably by the legal materials, leaving little
room for judicial discretion.”179 Despite the difficulty of the questions
addressed, Roberts’s opinions are written in the register of the very effective
advocate that he was. This one-sidedness, as Simon wryly notes, “takes a
toll on the integrity of the discourse,”180 especially when contrasted with the
equally confident but diametrically opposed reasoning Roberts offers in
other cases. Moreover, the very model of adjudication that he relies on in
concluding that partisan gerrymandering is a political question contemplates
a judiciary that is neutral and reactive rather than one that assumes an
advocate’s posture.181 Psychological phenomena may accordingly explain
the disconnect we have identified, but they do not justify them.
C. Passive Virtues
Might one nonetheless construct a story featuring judicial restraint? The
Chief Justice, after all, opened his confirmation hearings by articulating a
passive vision of his and the Court’s role.182 He opens Rucho by framing the
question presented as “whether the courts below appropriately exercised
judicial power.”183 He closes with the observation, “No one can accuse this
Court of having a crabbed view of the reach of its competence,”184 before
concluding that partisan gerrymandering—because it cannot be adjudicated
according to law—is beyond that reach.185 There is no law to govern the
177
See, e.g., Brief of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 1, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 18-422) (citing Shelby only in a list of voting
rights cases that the Lawyers’ Committee has worked on).
178
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resolution of these disputes, the reasoning states,
thus judges will
necessarily be—or at least appear to be—deciding based on their own
partisan biases. Roberts made this point during the oral argument in Gill v.
Whitford,187—the case in which he infamously characterized the plaintiffs’
proposed “efficiency gap” test as “sociological gobbledygook”188—positing
that “the intelligent man on the street” would regard the Court’s decisions as
a product of the fact that “the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over
the Republicans.”189 Michael Seidman makes a related argument in
defending Rucho’s result from a progressive perspective, arguing that to
hold partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable would be “turning the
question over to nine unelected and unrepresentative judges who are part of
an institution that has pretty consistently defended the most regressive forces
in our society.”190
The desire to avoid the appearance of partisanship may be a plausible
account of Rucho, but as Nicholas Stephanopoulos explains, it’s not an
account that holds across Roberts’s decision-making.191 Once again, Shelby
County, in which the Court engaged in just the sort of judicial intervention in
a partisan dispute that Rucho claims is beyond the appropriate bounds of the
judicial role, stands as a point of contrast. And as the preceding subpart notes,
Rucho’s confident rhetoric is arguably not the work of a restrained court.
There is another sense in which Rucho itself can be regarded as violating
a norm of judicial restraint. As Roberts’s opinion acknowledges, in Davis v.
Bandemer, “[a] majority of the Court agreed that the case was justiciable.”192
And as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Vieth v. Jubelirer, a majority
of the Justices in that case disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that
partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable.193 Yet, in the Court’s two
partisan gerrymandering cases preceding Rucho, the Chief Justice did not
acknowledge that consecutive majorities had supported the conclusion that
such claims were, or could be, justiciable, but rather portrayed the issue first
as a “question[] which has divided the Court,”194 and then as
“unresolved.”195 Rucho draws on those cases to set up the question of
186
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justiciability and thereby enables the Court to complete its overruling of
Bandemer without acknowledging that it had done so, much less engaging
in any direct analysis of whether it was appropriate to do so. 196 Elsewhere,
by contrast, Roberts has asserted that the overruling of precedent is an
extraordinary action requiring “special justification.”197 The upshot is by
now familiar. Viewed in isolation, a concern with the Court as an institution
seems a plausible explanation for Rucho. It seems less so when viewed in a
larger context.
D. Additudinalism/Strategic Decision-Making
The final possibility we consider is simply that the Chief Justice is acting
in the manner suggested by the attitudinal model—that is, his vote is
motivated by ideological rather than legal reasons. In the most basic version
of the story, the Chief Justice’s proffered rationales are no different from
those provided by more nakedly political actors, who routinely act out of
expediency to make present resort to principles that conflict with those they
have invoked in the past.198 A second version would draw on the strategic
model. On that view, Roberts’s motivation would encompass not simply his
policy preferences, but also his need to get votes from at least four other
Justices. This view, too, regards the justifications as cynically offered.
The cynical conclusion is certainly the one that Nicholas
Stephanopoulos draws. Speaking generally about the Court and its cases
relating to the political process, he claims:
[T]he Roberts Court consistently decides these cases in the
ways preferred by conservative elites; and that its resulting
decisions do, in fact, consistently aid Republicans. Moreover,
partisan advantage is a more reliable explanation than any
other factor. Whether or not it consciously drives any Justice’s
behavior, it better accounts for the Roberts Court’s election
law rulings than any alternative hypothesis.199
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Rick Hasen similarly characterizes the Court as having taken a
“pro-partisanship turn” that functions to “allow Republican [party]
entrenchment.”200 This story is broadly consistent with the Chief Justice’s
professional history, which includes clerkships with Judge Henry Friendly
and Justice William Rehnquist, as well as service in both the Reagan and
George H.W. Bush administrations.201
One might alternatively imagine Roberts’s motivations to be more
abstract, and, in that form, they might take more- or less-pernicious forms.
Among the more pernicious views, one might posit that the Chief Justice
harbors a general hostility to voting rights, which in turn provides the thread
running through both Rucho and Shelby County.202 A less pernicious take
would center on Roberts’s affinity for federalism.203 On this view, he prefers
to provide relatively more autonomy for states, but was blocked from basing
the Rucho decision on those grounds simply because federalism forms no
part of the political question doctrine.204
The specific form that any of this family of justifications might take is
not important for our purposes. All stand in contrast to and conflict with the
vision of the judiciary and of legitimate judicial conduct that purports to be
at the heart of Rucho’s rationale. Consideration of Rucho in light of Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinions more broadly does not refute, and may even
strongly suggest, the conclusion that some version of an attitudinal or
strategic explanation of his behavior is the most parsimonious.
CONCLUSION
One characterization of the conflict between the majority and dissent in
Rucho is that it pitted a majority concerned about the potential hit to the
Court’s perceived legitimacy that would flow from intervention in the
political process against a dissent willing to risk that hit in order to achieve
Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 50 (2020).
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Federalism for the Right to Vote, 104 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 41, 42–43 (2020) (“The Roberts Court
has demonstrated a clear pattern of hostility toward promoting the integrity of elections and voting rights.
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the greater good of protecting the integrity of democracy.
If that
characterization is correct, then our analysis suggests that the bargain Chief
Justice Roberts struck in the short term, properly viewed, came at some cost
to its (and his) perceived legitimacy over the longer term. The effort to avoid
the appearance of acting out of expediency itself appears to have been
undertaken out of expediency, and the effort to appear principled appears to
have been unprincipled. There is no consensus about the extent to which
judges should (or even can) be sincere in their reason-giving.206 The stark
contrasts in the Chief Justice’s rationales from one case to the next call into
question even his basic commitment to the ideal.
We ultimately make no claims about the ultimate nature or sources of
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision in Rucho or more generally. Nor do we
contend that every apparent tension we have identified among the opinions
he has authored is unresolvable. It may well be that there are appropriate
grounds on which to reach the conclusion that partisan gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable and to distinguish the disclaimer of judicial power
in Rucho from the exercise of judicial power in Shelby County.
Our concern instead is with the existence and extent of these apparent
tensions and contradictions, coupled with the Chief Justice’s lack of effort
even to acknowledge that existence, let alone to offer his resolutions. The
very things the Chief Justice emphasized as necessary ingredients to the
legitimate exercise of judicial power—rules, standards, and principles—are
the very things that are absent. The opinion provides no guides as to how to
determine when the factors it relies on compel judicial abdication and when
they instead counsel in favor of deferential review. Its articulated
justifications stand in significant tension, if not outright contradiction, with
those offered in Shelby County. The distinctions, if they exist, must be rooted
in factors left unstated and that are perhaps incapable of being reduced to
precise verbal formulation. That is not necessarily problematic. But in a
decision that purports to turn on the need for rationality and reasoned
distinction, it is, at best, deeply ironic.
***
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